Abstract-Often adaptive, distributed control can be viewed as an iterated game between independent players. The coupling between the players' mixed strategies, arising as the system evolves, is determined by the system designer. Information theory tells us that the most likely joint strategy of the players, given a value of the expectation of the overall control objective function, is the minimizer of a Lagrangian function of the joint strategy. So the goal of the system designer is to speed evolution of the joint strategy to that Lagrangian minimizing point, lower the expectated value of the control objective function, and repeat. Here we discuss how to do this using local descent procedures, and thereby achieve efficient, adaptive, distributed control.
I. INTRODUCTION
It turns out that one can translate many of the probabilitybased concepts from statistical physics, game theory, distributed optimization and distributed control into one another. This translation allows one to transfer theory and techniques between those fields, creating a large common mathematics that connects them. This common mathematics is known as Probability Collectives. It concerns the set of probability distributions that govern any distributed system, and how to manipulate those distributions to optimize one or more objective functions [1] .
This paper motivates Probability Collectives as a firstprinciples approach to adaptive distributed control problems [2] , [3] , [4] . To do this we represent such problems by having each control agent i set its state x t i independently of the other agents at each time t, by sampling an associated distribution, q t i (x t i ). In this representation the coupling between the agents does not arise directly, via statistical dependencies of the agents' states at the same time t. Rather it arises indirectly, through the stochastic joint evolution of their distributions {q t i } across time. More formally, let time be discrete, where at the beginning of each t all control agents simultaneously and independently set their states ("make their moves") by sampling their associated distributions. After they do so any remaining portions of the system (i.e., any stochastic part not being directly set by the control agents) responds to that joint move. Indicate the state of the entire system at time t as z t . (z t includes the joint move of the agents, x t , as well as the state at t of all stochastic elements not directly set by the agents.) So the joint distribution of the moves of the agents at any moment t is given by the product distribution q t (x t ) = i q t i (x t i ), and the state of the entire system, given joint move x t , is governed by P (z t | x t ). stefanb@stanford.edu
Now in general the observations by agent i of aspects of the system's state at times previous to t will determine q t i . In turn, those observations are determined by the previous states of the system. So q t i is statistically dependent on the previous states of the entire system, z {t <t} . Accordingly, the system can be viewed as a multi-stage noncooperative game among the agents and Nature. Each agent plays mixed strategies {q t i } at moment t, and Nature's move space at that time consists of those components of the vector z t not contained in x t [5] , [6] , [7] . The interdependence of the agents across time can be viewed as arising through information sets and the like, as usual in game theory.
For pedagogical simplicity, consider the problem of inducing an optimal state z rather than the problem of inducing an optimal sequence of states. 1 What the designer of the system can specify are the laws that govern how the joint mixed strategy q t gets updated from one stage of the game to the next. The goal is to specify such laws that will quickly lead to a good value of an overall objective function of the state of the system, F (z).
2 Note that the agents work in the space of x's; all aspects of the system not directly set by the agents, and in particular all noise processes, are implicitly contained in the distribution P (z | x). Tautologically then, in distributed control the goal is to induce a joint strategy q(x) with a good associated value of
Once such a q is found, one can sample it to get a final x, and be assured that, on average, the associated F value is low. G is called the world utility.
In this paper we elaborate an iterative scheme for updating product distributions q to monotonically lower E q (G). Each q in the sequence is defined indirectly, as the minimizer of a different G-parameterized Lagrangian, L G (q). Implementing such a sequence of Lagrangian-minimizing q's results in the optimal control policy for the distributed system, i.e., in the q minimizing E q (G). However while one cannot directly solve for the q minimizing E q (G) in a distributed manner, as elaborated below one can solve for the q minimizing each L G (q) in a distributed manner. In this way one can find the optimal distributed control policy using a purely distributed algorithm.
The distributed algorithms presented here use steepest descent-type techniques to minimize each successve La-1 See [8] for a discussion of the problem of optimizing a sequence. 2 Here we follow the convention that lower F is better and for simplicity only consider objectives that depend on the state of the system at a single instant. We indicate integrals of any sort, including point sums for countable x, with the R symbol. grangian. 3 Because the descent is over Euclidean vectors q, these algorithms can be applied whether the x i are categorical/symbolic, continuous, time-extended, or a mixture of the three. So in particular, they provide a principled way to do "gradient descent over categorical variables".
In the next section we derive the functional form of the Lagrangians L G (q) and discuss some of its properties.
In the following section we show how to apply gradient descent (and its embellishments) to optimize the Lagrangian in a distributed fashion. If we view the agents as engaged in a team game, all having the same utility G, then this gradient descent is a distributed scheme for each agent to update its strategy, in a way that will steer the game to a bounded rational equilibrium [1] .
In this section we also consider second order methods. In general any single application of Newton's method to update a product distribution q will result in a new distribution p q that is not a product distribution. So we must instead solve for the product distribution q (p q ) having minimal Kullback-Leibler distance to p q . In this section we derive the rule for iterative updating of our distribution so as to move q in the direction of q (p q ). Serendipitously, this rule can also be implemented in a distributed fashion.
In practice any local descent scheme often requires Monte Carlo sampling to estimate terms in the gradient. To minimize the expected quadratic error of the estimation, typically the game is changed from being a team game. In other words, in general changing the agent's utilities g i to not all equal G will result in lower bias plus variance of the estimation of the gradient, and therefore will speed evolution to a good joint strategy. These and other techniques for shrinking bias plus variance are discussed in [9] , [12] .
We end this section by mentioning some other techniques for improving the Monte Carlo sampling. These include data-aging, and techniques for managing the descent when it gets close to a border of the (Cartesian product of simplices constituted the) set of product distributions, Q. Most of these techniques introduced can be used even with schemes for minimizing L G (q) other than gradient descent. Miscellaneous proofs can be found in the appendix.
The version of Probability Collectives considered in this paper, involving product distributions, is called "Product Distribution" (PD) theory [9] . Some initial experiments on using PD theory for distributed optimization and distributed control can be found in [13] , [10] . See [11] , [12] , [8] for other uses and extensions of PD theory.
II. PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION LAGRANGIANS

A. The maxent Lagrangian
Say the designer stipulates a particular desired value of E(G), γ. For simplicity, consider the case where the designer makes no other claims concerning the system besides γ and the fact that the joint strategy is a product distribution. Then information theory tells us that the a priori most likely q consistent with that information is the one that maximizes entropy subject to that information [14] , [15] . 4 In other words, of all distributions that agree with the designer's information, that distribution is the "easiest" one to induce by random search.
So one can view the job of the designer of a distributed control system as an iterative equilibration process. In the first stage of each iteration the designer works to speed evolution of the joint strategy to the q with maximal entropy subject to a particular value of γ. Once we that solution is found we replace the constraint -replace the target value of E(G) -with a more difficult one. We then repeat the process, with another evolution of q [9] .
To formalize this, define the maxent Lagrangian by
where S(q) is the Shannon entropy of q, − dxq(x)ln
µ(x) , and for simplicity we take the prior µ to be uniform. 5 Given γ, the associated most likely joint strategy is the q that minimizes L(q) over all those (q, β) such that ∂L ∂β = 0. Solving, we find that the q i are related via a set of coupled Boltzmann equations (one for each agent i),
where the overall proportionality constant for each i is set by normalization, the subscript q β (i) on the expectation value indicates that it is evaluated according to the distribution j =i q j , and β is set to enforce the condition E q β (G) = γ. Following Nash, we can use Brouwer's fixed point theorem to establish that for any fixed β, there must exist at least one solution to this set of simultaneous equations.
In light of the foregoing, one natural choice for an algorithm that lowers E q (G) is the repeated iteration of the following step: Start with the q β matching a current γ value, then lower γ slightly, and end by modifying the old q β to find the one that matches the new γ. A difficulty with this iterative step is the need to solve for β as a function of γ. However we there is a way around this problem. Typically if we evaluate E(G) at the solutions q β , we find that it is a declining function of β. So in following the iterative procedure of equilibrating and then lowering γ we will raise β. Accordingly, we can avoid the repeated matching of β to each successive constraint E(G) = γ, and simply monotonically increase β instead. This allows us to avoid explicitly specifying values of γ (see appendix).
An alternative interpretation of this scheme is based on prior knowledge of the value of the entropy rather of the expected G. Given this alternative prior knowledge, we can recast the designer's goal as finding the q with minimal E(G), consistent with that prior knowledge. This again leads to Eq.'s 1 and 2. Now raising β is cast as lowering the (never-specified) prior knowledge of the entropy rather than the (never-specified) prior knowlege of E(G).
Simulated annealing is an example of this approach, where rather than work directly with q, one works with random samples of it formed via the Metropolis random walk algorithm. There is no a priori reason to use such an inefficient means of manipulating q however. Here we will work with q directly instead. This results in an algorithm that is not just "probabilistic" in that the updating of its variables is stochastic (as in simulated annealing). Rather the very entity being updated is a probability distribution.
Another advantage of casting the problem directly in terms of the maxent Lagrangian is that one can even avoid explicitly stipulating an annealing schedule. The usual first order methods can be used to find the saddle point of the Lagrangian, e.g., by performing steepest ascent of L in the Lagrange parameter β while performing a descent in q 6 . In many situations one should use a modification of the maxent Lagrangian. Whenever one has extra prior knowledge about the problem domain, that should be used to modify the use of entropy as (in statistics terminology) a regularizer. This leads to Bayesian formulations [1] . Similarly, if one has constraints {f i (x) = 0}, the Lagrangian has to be modified to accout for them. The most naive way of doing this is to simply cast the constraints as Lagrange penalty terms {E(f i ) = 0} and add those terms to the Lagrangian, in the usual way [10] 7 .
B. Shape of the maxent Lagrangian
Consider L as a function of q, with β and γ both treated as fixed parameters. (So in particular, E q (g) need not equal γ.) First, say that q (i) is also held fixed, with only q i allowed to vary. This makes E(g) linear in q i . In addition, entropy is a concave function, and the unit simplex is a convex region. Accordingly, the Lagrangian of Eq. 1 has a unique local minimum over q i ; there is no problem of "getting trapped in a local minimum" in a computational search for that minimum. Indeed, in this situation we can just jump directly to that global optimum, via Eq. 2. Now introduce the shorthand for any function U (x),
6 Formally, since the maxent Lagrangian is not convex, we have no guarantee that the duality gap is zero, and therefore no guarantee about saddlepoints. Nonetheless, just as in other domains, first order methods here seem to work well in practice. 7 Note though that since the gradient of entropy is infinite at the border of the unit simplex, we are guaranteed that no component of q will ever exactly equal 0, which typically means that the constraints {f i (x) = 0} will never be satisfied with probability exactly 1.
. This is the value of E(G) at i's bounded rational equilibrium for the fixed q (i) , i.e., it is the value at the minimum over q i of L. View that value as a function of β. One can show that this is a decreasing function. In fact, its derivative just equals the negative of the variance of
Next consider varying over all q ∈ Q, the space of all product distributions q. This is a convex space; if p ∈ Q and p ∈ Q, then so is any distribution on the line connecting p and p . However over this space, the E(G) term in L is multilinear. So L is not a simple convex function of q. So we do not have guarantees of a single local minimum.
The following lemma extends the technique of Lagrange parameters to off-equilibrium points:
Lemma 1: Let y ∈ R n be a point consistent with a set of constraints over R n , {f i (y) = 0}. Consider the set of all vectors leading from y that are, to first order, consistent with those constraints. Of those vectors, the one giving the steepest ascent of a function V (y) is u = ∇V + i λ i (y )∇f i , up to an overall proportionality constant, where the λ i (y ) enforce the first order consistency conditions, u · ∇f i = 0 ∀i. Now examine the derivatives of S(q) with respect to all components of q, i.e., the q-gradient of the entropy. At the border of Q, at least one of the ln(q i ) terms in those derivatives will be negative infinite. Combined with Lemma 1, this can be used to establish that at the edge of Q, the steepest descent direction of any player's Lagrangian points into the interior of Q (assuming finite β and {G}). (This is reflected in the equilibrium solutions Eq. 2.) Accordingly, whereas Nash equilibria can be on the edge of Q (e.g., for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium), in bounded rational games any equilibrium must lie in the interior of Q; any equilibrium (i.e., any local minimum) of a bounded rational game has non-zero probability for all joint moves. So just as when only varying a single q i , we never have to consider extremal mixed strategies in searching for equilibria over all Q. We can use local descent schemes instead [10] , [16] .
Lemma 1 can also be used to construct G with more than one solution to Eq. 2. One can also show that for every player i and any point q interior to Q, there are directions in Q along which i's Lagrangian is locally convex. Accordingly, no player's Lagrangian has a local maximum interior to Q. So if there are multiple local minima of i's Lagrangian, they are separated by saddle points across ridges. In addition, the uniform q is a solution to the set of coupled equations Eq. 2, but typically is not a local minimum, and therefore must be a saddle point.
Relaxing the restriction to product distributions, the Lagrangian becomes L(p) = β(E p (G) − γ) − S(p), where p can be any distribution over x. There is only one local minimum of this Lagrangian, the canonical ensemble:
In general p β is not a product distribution. However we can ask what product distribution is closest to it.
Properly, to best approximate a target distribution p with an element of some set C we must first specify a misfit measure for how well any q ∈ C approximates p. We then solve for the q with the smallest misfit. How best to measure distances between probability distributions is a topic of ongoing controversy and research. The most common way to do so is with the infinite limit log likelihood of data being generated by one distribution but misattributed to have come from the other, i.e., the Kullback-Leibler distance [14] :
where
] is known as the cross entropy from p 1 to p 2 (and as usual we implicitly choose uniform µ). The KL distance is always non-negative, and equals zero iff its two arguments are identical.
As shorthand, define the "pq distance" as KL(p || q), and the "qp distance" as KL(q || p), where p is our target distribution and q is a product distribution. Then it is straightforward to show that the qp distance from q to target distribution p β is just the maxent Lagrangian L(q), up to irrelevant overall constants. In other words, the q minimizing the maxent Lagrangian is q with the minimal qp distance to the associated canonical ensemble.
However the qp distance is the (infinite limit of the negative log of) the likelihood that p would attribute to data generated by q. It can be argued that a better measure of how well q approximates p is the likelihood that q attributes to data generated by p. This is the pq distance; it gives a different Lagrangian from that of Eq. 1.
Evaluating, up to an overall additive constant (of the canonical distribution's entropy), the pq distance is
This is a game where each i has the "Lagrangian"
The minimizer of this is just q i = p i ∀i, i.e., each q i is set to the associated marginal distribution of p.
In most of this paper we restrict attention to the qp KL distance and associated maxent Lagrangian.
III. DESCENT OF THE MAXENT LAGRANGIAN
A. Gradient descent
Consider the situation where each x i can take on a finite number of possible values, |X i |. Say we are iteratively evolving q to minimize L for some fixed β, and are currently at some point q ∈ Q. Using Lemma 1, we can evaluate the direction from q within Q that, to first order, will result in the largest drop in the value of L(q):
, and the symbol ∂ R indicates that we do not mean the indicated partial derivative, formally speaking, but rather the indicated component of the 1st-order descent vector 8 . Eq. 5 specifies the change that each agent should make to its distribution to have them jointly implement a step in steepest descent of the maxent Lagrangian. These updates are completely distributed, in the sense that each agent's update at time t is independent of any other agents' update at that time. Typically at any t each agent i knows q i (t) exactly, and therefore knows ln[q i (j)]. However often it will not know G and/or the q (i) . In such cases it will not be able to evaluate the E(G | x i = j) terms in Eq. 5 in closed form, and Monte Carlo processes must be used instead [12] .
B. Higher order descent schemes
In general, second order descent of the maxent Lagrangian is non-trivial, due to coupling between the agents that forces us to invert a matrix. An alternative approach starts by making a quadratic approximation (over the space of all p, not just all q) to the maxent Lagrangian, L(p). Via Newton's method this specifies a p * that minimizes that quadratic approximation. We can then find the product distribution that is nearest (in pq KL distance) to p * . This scheme is called Nearest Newton descent.
The gradient and Hessian of L at a current point p 0 are
This Hessian is positive-definite (given that p 0 ∈ P). By simple Lagrange parameters, the (normalized) distribution that minimizes a paraboloid with this Hessian and gradient is either on the border of P, or if in the interior is given by
where λ is set by normalization. Solving, either
where E(G) is evaluated under p 0 , or p * is on the simplex edge. 8 Formally speaking, the partial derivative is given by u i (j). Intuitively, the reason for subtracting P x i u i (x i )/|X i | is to keep the distribution in the set of all possible probability distributions over x, P.
The right-hand side is exactly the direction you should go using (simplex-constrained) gradient descent of L(p). So the direction to p * from p 0 is given by the Hadamard product of p 0 and the direction given by gradient descent. Now we can approximate p * with the product distribution having the minimal KL distance to it. In particular, consider using pq KL distance rather than qp KL distance. Recall that for this kind of KL distance, the optimal product distribution approximation to a joint distribution is given by the product of the marginals of that joint distribution (see the discussion just below Eq. 4). Say that p 0 is in the form of a product distribution, q 0 , i.e., that we are starting from a product distribution. Then calculating the marginals of the associated p * to get q * is trivial:
Since the original quadratic approximation was over the full joint space, Eq. 6 accounts for inter-agent couplings. In practice, it may make sense not to jump all the way from q 0 to q * , but only part-way there. (If q * isn't in the interior of the simplex, such partial jumping is necessary.) One guide to how far to jump is the pq KL distance from p * to i q * i . Unlike the KL distances to the joint Boltzmann distribution, we can readily calculate this KL distance.
The conditional expectations in Nearest Newton are the same as those in gradient descent. Accordingly, they too can be estimated via Monte Carlo sampling, if need be. It's also worth noting that Eq. 6 has the same form as one would get by evaluating the Hessian of the maxent Lagrangian, so long as one ignored inter-agent aspects of that Hessian.
IV. APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Lemma 1
Proof: Consider the set of u such that the directional derivatives D u f i evaluated at y all equal 0. These are the directions first-order consistent with our constraints. We need to find the u such that D u V evaluated at y is maximal.
To simplify the analysis we introduce the constraint that | u| = 1. This means that the directional derivative D u V for any function V is just u · ∇V . We then use Lagrange parameters to solve our problem. Our constraints on u are
Differentiating the Lagrangian gives
where all dependencies on y are implicit. The solution is
λ 0 enforces our constraint on | u|. Since we are only interested in specifying u up to a proportionality constant, we can set 2λ 0 = 1. Redefining the Lagrange parameters by multiplying them by −1 gives the result claimed. QED.
B. Proof of claims following Lemma 1
For generality, the proofs provided here allow each agent i to replace G with a different private utility g i (cf. [12] ). i) Define f i (q) ≡ dx i q i (x i ), i.e., f i is the constraint forcing q i to be normalized. Now for any q that equals zero for some joint move there must be an i and an x i such that q i (x i ) = 0. Plugging into Lemma 1, we can evaluate the component of the direction of steepest descent along the direction of player i's probability of making move x i :
Since there must some
is finite. Therefore our component is negative infinite. So L can be reduced by increasing q i (x i ). Accordingly, no q having zero probability for some joint move x can be a minimum of i's Lagrangian. ii) To construct a multiple equilibria bounded rational game, note that at any (necessarily interior) local minimum q,
must be independent of x i , for each i, by Lemma 1. So say there is a component-by-component bijection T (x) ≡ (T 1 (x 1 ), T 2 (x 2 ), . . .) that leaves all the {g j } unchanged, i.e., such that g j (x) = g j (T (x)) ∀x, j 9 . Define q by q (x) = q(T (x)) ∀x. Then ∀x
9 As an example, consider a congestion team game where all players have the same move set, and the shared utility G is a function only of the k-indexed bit string {N (x, k)}, where N (x, k) = 1 iff there is a move that is shared by exactly k of the players when the joint move is x. In this case T just permutes the set of possible moves in the same way for all players.
where the invariance of g i was used in the penultimate step. Since q is a local minimum though, this last difference must equal 0. Therefore q is also a local minimum. Now choose the game so that ∀i, x i , T (x i ) = x i . (Our congestion game example has this property.) Then the only way the transformation q → q(T ) can avoiding producing a new product distribution is if q i (x i ) = q i (x i ) ∀i, x i , x i , i.e., q is uniform. Say the Hessians of the players' Lagrangians are not all positive definite at the uniform q. (For example have our congestion game be biased away from uniform multiplicities.) Then that q is not a local minimum of the Lagrangians. Therefore at a local minimum, q = q(T ). Accordingly, q and q(T ) are two distinct equilibria. iii) To establish that at any q there is always a direction along which any player's Lagrangian is locally convex, fix all but two of the {q i }, q 0 and q 1 , and fix both q 0 and q 1 for all but two of their respective possible values, which we can write as q 0 (0), q 0 (1), q 1 (0), and q 1 (1), respectively. So we can parameterize the set of q we're considering by two real numbers, x ≡ q 0 (0) and y ≡ q 1 (0). The 2 × 2 Hessian of L as a function of x and y is The eigenvalue for the positive root must be positive. So along the corresponding eigenvector, L is convex at q. QED.
C. Dependence of E q (G) on β i) There are several ways to show that the value of E q β i ([g i ] i,q (i) ) must shrink as β grows. Here we do so by evaluating the associated derivative with respect to β.
Define N (U ) ≡ dy e −U (y) . View the x i -indexed vector q β i as a function of β, g i and q (i) . So we can write E(g i ) = E q β i (β,gi,q (i) ),q (i) (g i ). Then one can expand
where the variance is over x i sampled from q β i (x i ). QED. ii) In general, there are multiple solutions to Eq. 2, at all of which ∇L(q) = 0. So to analyze the β-dependence of the expected value of G one has to keep track of each of those multiple solutions and their separate dependences on β. This can be quite laborious.
As an alternative, recall from above that there is a single fully coupled distribution p β that minimizes L(p) ≡ β(E p (G) − γ) − S; this is the optimal p. In addition, as discussed in the text, the maxent Lagrangian L(q) is equal to the Kullback-Leibler distance from q to that optimal p. So the solutions of Eq. 2 are the q's that locally minimize the distance to p β . So those q's "track" the distribution p β whenever it moves due to a change in β. Now as shown elsewhere in this appendix, E p β (G) is a decreasing function of β. So when we increase β, the associated solutions of Eq. 2 track p β as closely as possible as it lowers its E(G). In this sense, raising β is "equivalent" to lowering expected G for the solutions to Eq. 2.
